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Abstract 
This article aims to give an overview of Carnap’s 1928 book Logical Structure of the 
World or Aufbau and the most influential interpretations of its significance. After giving an 
outline of the book in section II, I turn to the first sustained interpretations of the book offered 
by Goodman and Quine in section III. Section IV explains how this empirical reductionist 
interpretation was largely displaced by its main competitor. This is the line of interpretation 
offered by Friedman and Richardson which focuses on issues of objectivity. In section V I turn to 
two more recent interpretations that can be thought of as emphasizing Carnap’s concern with 
rational reconstruction. Finally, the article concludes by noting some current work by Leitgeb 
that aims to develop and update some aspects of the Aufbau project for contemporary 
epistemology. 
I. Introduction 
Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) is a central figure in the development of analytic philosophy, 
with influences ranging from the foundations of logic and mathematics through the philosophy 
of science and the philosophy of language. His first book Der logische Aufbau der Welt was 
published in 1928, but translated into English as The Logical Structure of the World only in 1967. 
Despite this delay, it is fair to say that the Aufbau, as the book is typically called, is one of the 
most important books for the history of analytic philosophy. The exact nature of the Aufbau’s 
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significance remains a subject of intense debate largely because different interpreters have 
drawn attention to different aspects of the work at the expense of other aspects. These 
disagreements, along with the fairly technical details of certain parts of Carnap’s discussion, 
make the book somewhat daunting for first-time readers. The main aim of this article is to help 
the non-specialist approach the Aufbau and begin to appreciate why so many philosophers 
have spent so much time trying to understand it. 
II. An Overview of Constitution Theory 
Carnap’s primary goal in the Aufbau is to introduce a novel discipline that he refers to as 
“constitution theory”. This theory aims to develop and investigate several constitution systems 
using the results of the various sciences along with the formal logical resources developed by 
Frege, Russell and Whitehead, among others. In the preface of the book Carnap signals the 
“inner kinship” between this work and the broader cultural movements “which strive for 
meaningful forms of personal and collective life” (xviii). As we will see, constitution theory itself 
requires the collaboration of scientists and philosophers of a certain kind, and Carnap seems to 
have hoped that the Aufbau would revolutionize the practice of philosophy. 
The book itself is divided into five parts. The first part sets out the main objectives of 
constitution theory. Carnap begins with Russell’s maxim that “Wherever possible, logical 
constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities” and states his aim to be to provide a 
constitution system in which all scientific objects are constituted out of a few in a fully rigorous 
logical way. A central thesis is that there are such constitution systems that build on a single 
domain. This shows, for Carnap, the unity of our scientific knowledge that is hidden underneath 
the divisions between the sciences as they are typically practiced. In the only extended example 
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that Carnap gives of a constitution system a single relation is shown to be sufficient for the 
constitution. The remaining objects are constituted on this slender basis using definitions that 
employ only the basic relation and logical symbols. Another priority in the first part is Carnap’s 
view that scientific knowledge is objective despite its origins in subjective experiences. 
The second part of the Aufbau presents a preliminary survey of the form of scientific 
statements and the different stages of the constitution system. Carnap insists that the ultimate 
form of scientific statements must be given in purely logical or structural terms. This is because 
each object studied by science can be constituted or defined using a definite description that 
picks out the object using just its formal relations to other scientific objects. Using the example 
of the railway stations of Eurasia, Carnap explains how a purely structural definite description 
of each station is possible in terms of the network of connections between the stations. This 
presentation of scientific knowledge is motivated by the concern about objectivity: “science 
wants to speak about what is objective, and whatever does not belong to the structure but to 
the material … is, in the final analysis, subjective” (§ 16). Physics is presented as already almost 
completely structural based on its reliance on mathematics. 
Part three surveys in more detail what Carnap calls the “formal problems” for his 
constitution system: the ascension forms, the system form, the basis, the object forms and the 
form of representing a constitution system. It is only with this discussion of the ascension form 
that Carnap’s sparse conception of constitution becomes evident. For he insists that each 
scientific object be defined in a narrow sense of “definition” that implies that all statements 
about that object be translatable into statements that are just about the basic objects of the 
system. Two sorts of definitions are allowed. In an explicit definition each sign for the object 
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being defined is replaced by signs for objects that have already been defined. A more flexible 
notion of definition is definition in use. This focuses only on entire sentences and requires that 
any sentence containing a sign for the object can be transformed into a sentence that uses only 
signs for previously defined objects. Carnap presents either kind of definition as sufficient not 
only to constitute the new objects out of the old objects, but also to reduce the new objects to 
the old objects (§ 35).  
Carnap repeatedly emphasizes that no further conclusions should be drawn about the 
status of an object based on its reducibility or on the existence of a constitutive definition. 
Manifestations of this attitude are Carnap’s insistence that there is no significant distinction 
between scientific concepts and scientific objects (§ 5) and that an acceptable definition need 
only preserve the logical value or extension of the sign being defined (§ 51). Any additional 
associations with a scientific statement are deemed irrelevant. This conception of translation 
makes definitions easier to achieve and highlights a difference between Carnap’s claims about 
reduction and some other more ambitious philosophical projects. 
Carnap explains the details of his constitution systems using the logical vocabulary of 
Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. At the bottom of their logic, Russell and 
Whitehead place individuals. Then come classes of these individuals, followed by classes of 
classes of these individuals, and so on. Each level corresponds to a different type of object and 
Carnap uses this notion of type to make sense of the differences among scientific objects. In 
particular, he emphasizes that explicit definitions are adequate to constitute an object from 
other objects in that type, while definitions in use constitute an object of higher type from 
objects of lower type (§§ 38-39). From a logical perspective, though, we can see all the objects 
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of the constitution system as classes whose elements ultimately terminate in objects of the 
lowest type. 
Part three also contains Carnap’s explanation for his particular choice of constitution 
system. He requires that the definitions of this system respect the order of epistemic primacy. 
This order reflects how an individual can come to know something about the object. Carnap 
introduces a notion of indicator to make this more precise: “We shall use the term ‘indicator’ 
only for such conditions as are ordinarily used to identify the state of affairs” that is a basic kind 
of occurrence for that kind of object (§ 49). He assumes that each scientific object has “an 
infallible and at the same time always present indicator” (§ 49) so that adequate definitions are 
in principle available for every object. The resulting constitution system begins with the 
elementary experiences of a single individual, and so is called “autopsychological” to distinguish 
it from other heteropsychological systems that begin with the experiences of other individuals 
(§ 58). Carnap’s basis is specified using a single basic relation Rs of recollected similarity. The 
elementary experiences are thought of as total momentary experiences that include as aspects 
inputs from all the different sense modalities including the will and the emotions. “x Rs y” 
obtains when a memory of x is compared to a present experience y and some similarity is found 
in some respect (§ 78). 
A final crucial contribution from part three is Carnap’s introduction of four languages 
that he will use to present his constitution system. The basic language is the language of logic 
because it is the most precise and least likely to suggest improper interpretations. Additional 
languages are used for clarification and motivation. They are an ordinary “word” language, a 
realist language and a language of fictional construction. Each definition can be given using 
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these alternative languages and Carnap does this for some of the definitions of his constitution 
system. But he is quite clear that the logical language is the only one that he takes seriously and 
that any additional realistic or idealistic connotations of the other languages should be rejected. 
In part four Carnap presents his outline of the autopsychological constitution system. It 
is divided into three stages. In the first stage the autopsychological domain is constituted using 
the basic relation Rs. Here many of the definitions are presented in full detail and Carnap seems 
to think the constitutions are more or less complete. In the second stage, Carnap extends the 
system to the physical world. Here the definitions are not given in any detail and Carnap 
concedes in at least one place that “our kind of constitution of physical points and of the 
physical space is by no means a fully satisfactory solution” (§ 124). Finally, in the third stage, the 
experiences of others along with an intersubjective world are given. Again, the definitions are 
merely sketched. Carnap alludes to two final levels where he locates cultural objects and 
values. 
 Carnap deploys a novel logical procedure called “quasi-analysis” when he constitutes 
the autopsychological domain. The definitions operate on the pairs of elementary experiences 
satisfied by the Rs relation and deliver classes or relations between such experiences or higher 
level entities like a class of relations between classes of experiences. These higher level entities 
are used to define objects called quality classes, which are described in the realistic language as 
classes of elementary experiences that have a particular quality, like a color at a point in the 
visual field or a smell, in common (§ 112). But given that the elementary experiences are 
treated as units, this is not a genuine decomposition into parts, so it is called “quasi-analysis”. 
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Quality classes, in turn, are used to define the sensations and the visual field is picked out by 
some of its characteristic features.  
A different approach is used to constitute the physical things that make up the physical 
world. Carnap begins by setting up a four-dimensional manifold of real numbers with an 
ordinary Euclidean metric. This purely mathematical object is constituted at the earliest stages 
of the constitution system (§ 107). The first coordinate is thought of as the time coordinate, 
while the other three are the usual spatial coordinates. Carnap then presents 12 policies for 
assigning colors from the visual field to the “world points” of this “space-time world” (§ 126). 
Using this assignment, Carnap proceeds to constitute the visual things, including one labeled 
“my body”. This step, in turn, allows a further identification of the other sensory modalities 
such as touch, and sensations from these senses are then applied to the world points as well. 
The end result of this fleshing out of the visual world is the perceptual world populated by 
perceptual things. It is only at this point that Carnap constitutes the physical world and the 
physical objects. They are obtained by coordinating the sensory qualities of the perceptual 
world with the numerical state magnitudes of the physical world. A key requirement, though, is 
that the resulting physical world be governed by deterministic laws. Carnap allows that there 
are several ways to do this, but counsels that principles of simplicity can be used to settle on a 
particular system of state magnitudes and laws (§ 136). 
The last stage of the constitution system begins with the identification of other humans 
and the constitution of their sensory experiences based on their actions and statements (§ 
140). Carnap then argues that there will be a kind of correspondence between the experiences 
that we wind up attributing to others and what we have constituted for ourselves. The resulting 
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common overlap is called “intersubjective coordination” (§ 146) and is used to constitute an 
“intersubjective world” (§ 148) upon which all agents can agree. In line with Carnap’s earlier 
discussion of subjectivity and objectivity, the intersubjective world is the subject matter of 
genuine scientific investigation and all claims about it are communicable to all agents (§ 149). 
Finally, part five of the Aufbau discusses some of the implications of constitution theory 
for traditional philosophical problems such as the relation between mind and body and the 
decision between realism and idealism. Carnap takes the objects in his constitution system to 
exhaust what is properly the concern of scientific knowledge. While other attitudes or 
approaches to life are allowed, all genuinely factual issues must be resolved in terms amenable 
to his sort of constitution. This means, in particular, that any further questions about the 
“essence” or “nature” of the mind, the body or their relation are not well-formed questions. 
Similarly, the traditional debate between realists and idealists about the existence of physical 
objects independently of minds is dismissed. This does not stop Carnap from articulating a 
distinction between empirically real objects and illusions. But this distinction is given in terms of 
the levels of his constitution system, e.g. is a given perceptual object coordinated with a 
physical object that is located in the physical world (§ 170)? Of course, this system-specific 
sense of “real” is a far cry from the traditional philosophical debate, but this is precisely the sort 
of overcoming of traditional philosophy, especially metaphysics, that Carnap hoped for. 
III. Empiricist Reduction 
Goodman offered the first sustained discussion of Carnap’s Aufbau and his objections to 
it remain some of the most influential. Goodman approaches the Aufbau as a “constructional” 
system that starts with particulars and aims to construct universals like qualities. Goodman 
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argues that a condition of adequacy for such a system is that its definitions not depend on 
“doubtful extrasystematic assumptions” (Structure 134). This shows that Goodman has a prior 
standard that he uses to judge the adequacy of Carnap’s definitions. The failure of Carnap’s 
approach is used to motivate Goodman’s own preference for a system that begins with sensory 
qualities and seeks to construct particular experiences. 
Goodman’s objections focus entirely on Carnap’s constitution of the autopsychological 
domain. The basic point is that Carnap’s transition from the elementary experiences to the 
points of the visual field and its colors will capture their intended domain only if the elementary 
experiences are related in a very special way by the Rs relation. Carnap’s first step is to define 
the classes of part similar (Ps) experiences as the union of pairs of experiences that stand in the 
Rs relation in either order. The similarity circles are obtained from the classes of Ps experiences 
by taking the largest class of experiences such that every member of the class is part similar to 
every member of the class. Carnap assumes that these similarity circles will overlap, and so 
must introduce some complexities to isolate the circles that are meant to represent particular 
qualities, e.g. a given color at a given place in the visual field. Goodman’s two main objections 
of “companionship” and “imperfect community” can arise at several stages, but we will put 
them in terms of the adequacy of the similarity circles. Companionship applies when the 
pattern of Rs relations makes Carnap’s procedure miss subclasses of the similarity circles that 
are genuinely similar in some respect, while imperfect community comes into play when the 
procedure generates similarity circles over and above those that are genuinely present. 
Suppose we find {1, 2, 3} to be a similarity circle. The former difficulty would occur if the quality 
a occurred only in experiences 1, 2 and 3 while b occurred only in 2 and 3. Then Carnap’s 
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procedure would have no similarity circle {2, 3} because the maximization rule requires that we 
also add in 1 to this set. So, even though these two experiences are similar in an important 
respect, they have no separate similarity circle. The latter imperfect community problem arises 
in a simple way when 1 and 2 have quality a, 2 and 3 have quality b and 3 and 1 have quality c. 
Each member here stands in the Rs relation to every member and so {1, 2, 3} could wind up as a 
similarity circle. Carnap’s definitions, then, would suggest that {1, 2, 3} is a genuine similarity 
circle even though there is no actual similarity shared among these three experiences. 
Carnap shows some awareness of Goodman’s concerns in the Aufbau itself (§ 81). His 
remarks suggest that does not think that “extrasystematic” assumptions are needed to rule out 
Goodman’s difficulties. Instead, Carnap claims that if an agent found herself in one of these 
unfavorable situations, she would not be in a position to realize the deficiency of the 
definitions. As the system aims to reconstruct the agent’s knowledge, this can be understood as 
a failing of the agent’s knowledge, not the system itself. To evaluate this response we would 
have to decide the extent to which Carnap aims merely at some kind of rational reconstruction 
or at the justification of our knowledge.  
Quine focuses on a different stage in the constitution, namely the constitution of 
perceptual things, but as with Goodman, Quine uses the alleged failures of Carnap’s project to 
motivate an alternative project. In line with Carnap’s remarks about translation, Quine assumes 
Carnap is a radical reductionist: “Radical reductionism … set itself the task of specifying a sense-
datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by 
statement into it” (‘Two Dogmas’ 39). The project fails when Carnap tries to assign perceptual 
qualities to space-time points as he constitutes the perceptual world. The rules counsel us to 
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maximize certain features of our overall assignment, and so “it provides no indication … of how 
a statement of the form ‘Quality q is at x;y;z;t’ could ever be translated into Carnap’s initial 
language of sense data. The connective ‘is at’ remains an added undefined connective” (‘Two 
Dogmas’ 40). Elsewhere in “Epistemology Naturalized” Quine makes clear why radical 
reductionism was desirable and what the implications of its failure are. If all scientific objects 
could be defined in sensory terms, then this “could be expected to elicit and clarify the sensory 
evidence for science” as well as “deepen our understanding of our discourse about the world” 
(‘Epistemology’ 74-75). The failure to define “is at” shows Quine that such aspirations should be 
given up and that we should settle for his own descriptive approach to epistemology that sees 
questions of epistemology as part of psychology. 
As we saw, Carnap recognized the limitations of his transition to the physical world (§ 
124), but it remains unclear if he was worried about the sorts of problems that Quine 
mentioned. On Carnap’s behalf we can note that, as more recent interpreters argue, it is not 
clear that Carnap’s main concern was empiricist reduction. At the very least, we can note 
Carnap’s remark from a 1935 paper that the “theory of knowledge is in its previous form an 
unclear mixture of psychological and logical elements. That holds as well for the work of our 
circle, not excluding my own earlier work” (quoted by Ricketts 258). This suggests that Carnap 
gave a different diagnosis of the failures of the Aufbau project than Quine. Carnap’s own 
reactions to the criticisms of Goodman and Quine are given in his “Intellectual Autobiography” 
and his “Replies” in Schilpp (ed.). 
IV. Objectivity 
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Michael Friedman is responsible for much of the contemporary interest in the Aufbau 
based on two papers: “Carnap’s Aufbau Reconsidered” (1987) and “Epistemology in the 
Aufbau” (1992), reprinted with a postscript and additional footnotes in Reconsidering Logical 
Positivism (1999). He objected to Goodman’s and Quine’s interpretations based on the near-
absence of traditional empiricist motivations for reduction of scientific objects to experience in 
Carnap’s text. Friedman instead emphasizes Carnap’s many remarks about the need to make 
the experiences of individuals objective through purely structural definite descriptions. This 
preoccupation is linked with the Kantian demand for an explanation of how objective 
knowledge is possible. Here Friedman notes striking similarities with the neo-Kantian 
philosophers that Carnap cites in the Aufbau such as Rickert and Bauch, from the so-called 
Southwest school, and Natorp and Cassirer, from the so-called Marburg school. Friedman 
argues that the new logic of Frege and Russell allows Carnap to transform the extant accounts 
of objectivity so that “a radically new conception of objectivity” (Friedman 95) emerges. In 
particular, the strength of the formal logic that Carnap employs lets him aspire to a kind of 
philosophical neutrality that is absent in the various neo-Kantian approaches. 
Friedman uses his interpretation to explain Carnap’s detailed constitution of the 
autopsychological domain which many empiricists would take for granted. An additional benefit 
of the focus on objectivity is that it allows an understanding of Carnap’s peculiar attempt to 
define his basic relation Rs using a purely structural definite description in §§ 153-155. The idea 
behind this definition is that only the intended Rs relation will give rise to a chosen “empirical 
theorem”. This is a theorem that is not a logical consequence of the constitutive definitions, 
e.g. that the color solid has three dimensions (§ 155). But Carnap realizes that a purely 
13 
 
structural definition will fail to be unique here because the domain of experiences can be 
permuted to yield any number of unintended relations with the same structure. The somewhat 
lame attempt to solve this problem is to posit a special kind of “founded” relation based on its 
natural or experiential features. For Friedman, this deprives the definition of Rs of its purely 
structural character and so “the difficulty is extremely fundamental” (103). 
In later discussions Friedman has admitted that this difficulty is not as fundamental as 
he earlier thought (105 fn. 24, noting 43 fn. 29). His stated reason for this shift is that he now 
believes that Carnap has no need to ground his constitution system in some domain of objects 
that is independent of the constitution system. Instead, the objectivity of the various scientific 
objects is achieved using only the resources available from within the constitution system. So 
there is a notion of objectivity that is internal to the constitution system. Although Friedman 
does not put it this way, we can emphasize the existence within the constitution system of the 
intersubjective objects of the intersubjective world. At the time of writing the Aufbau, it may be 
that this sort of system-specific intersubjectivity was all the objectivity that Carnap needed. This 
does not undermine Friedman’s basic point that Carnap’s neo-Kantian context is important for 
his development or that it influenced his structural conception of objectivity. 
Still, Friedman continues to worry that “serious technical problems” (160) undermine 
the Aufbau. He is concerned about the same place in the system that Quine focused his 
objections. Friedman’s objection is that the defined objects here are not assigned a particular 
level in the hierarchy of classes. The problem is not Quine’s problem that the open-ended 
character of the rules blocks a translation of a statement into a statement about experiences. It 
is rather the fact that later stages of the constitution system, such as the reports of others, are 
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used to adjust the earlier stages of the constitution system. This creates a kind of circularity so 
that “Carnap’s construction of the physical world … is continually revised to infinity” (161).  
On this interpretation, what is missing is a stable standpoint outside of a given 
constitution system that can be used to effectively carry out the required constitutions. In his 
book Carnap’s Construction of the World (1998) Alan Richardson arrives at a similar conclusion 
based on a different understanding of the connection between Carnap’s Aufbau and its neo-
Kantian context. Richardson draws on Carnap’s work prior to 1928 to discern two conceptions 
of objectivity in the Aufbau. The first is the quest for purely structural definite descriptions 
based on the given structure of the Rs relation noted by Friedman. But Richardson notes a 
second conception of objectivity based on the mathematically specified structures of physics. 
This second approach emphasizes the need for new structures to be brought into coordination 
with experience if the originally subjective experiences are to be made objective and suitable 
for scientific study, e.g. as in psychology. The existence of two notions of objectivity creates 
serious tensions within Carnap’s project. One problem that Richardson emphasizes is the 
difficulty of locating the second conception of objectivity within the constitution system that 
Carnap gives in the Aufbau, or indeed anywhere in his constitution theory. Carnap’s distinction 
between subjective and objective “must find a place either within the realm of empirical 
concepts of the objective sciences or within the formal concepts of logic. It is precisely the 
inability of the objective-subjective divide to be captured comfortably in either realm that lends 
it its problematic status here” (184). 
Taking the empirical realm first, it might seem acceptable for Carnap to cash out his 
conception of objectivity using only resources internal to his constitution system as it is this 
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system that is meant to clarify the scientific knowledge of an agent. Richardson objects to this 
route because he argues that scientific knowledge deals only with objective matters and so it 
has no access to the crucial epistemological distinction between the subjective and the 
objective: “it is manifestly not a distinction within any empirical science, since these are 
recognizable as such simply because they deal with the objectively only” (189). Locating the 
objective-subjective divide using formal logic is no better. Here Carnap does have the notion of 
a purely structural definite description at his disposal, but taking this too seriously undermines 
his constitution of the physical world and also leads to the failed attempt to eliminate the basic 
Rs relation. Richardson sees the latter as a sign of how attempting a formal, logical 
characterization of objectivity leads to the erasure of “the distinction between logic and 
empirical science” (194). The diagnosis is clear: “The way out … would have to consist in the 
adoption of a genuine metalogical perspective” (197). Here Richardson links the failures of 
Carnap’s Aufbau project to his later Logical Syntax project where Carnap will struggle to 
articulate a metalanguage that he can use to discuss the various object languages of the 
sciences. 
V. Rational Reconstruction 
Pincock’s “Reserved Reading of Carnap’s Aufbau” (2005) can be seen as responding to 
some of these concerns by casting constitution theory as an empirical scientific discipline: “The 
standards and assumptions of traditional science take the place of any substantial philosophical 
motivations or presuppositions … neutrality is achieved by construction theory because it is one 
more scientific discipline” (Pincock 522-523). Seizing on Carnap’s remark that “Science as a 
whole … needs both an experiential and a materialistic derivation of all concepts” (§ 59), 
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Pincock ties the autopsychological constitution system to a special purpose: its “focus is on the 
rational reconstruction of our actual cognitive processes, smoothed out and appropriately 
clarified” (526). By contrast, a physical constitution’s order “is an order of physical dependence” 
(532). On this interpretation, the structural conception of objectivity is, contra Richardson, “not 
imposed from the outside as a criterion of adequacy on the cognitive construction system, but 
is rather something that must be reconstructed within it, along with all other relevant features 
of our cognition” (530). This limited concern with objectivity is reinforced, for Pincock, by his 
suggestion that there is no analogous need to constitute an intersubjective world in the 
physical constitution system because its basis starts off as already objective.  
In his recent book Carnap and Twentieth Century Thought (2007), Carus also emphasizes 
the importance of rational reconstruction of existing scientific knowledge for an understanding 
of the Aufbau project. Unlike Pincock, though, Carus traces the development of Carnap’s 
autopsychological system in some detail, noting a number of important shifts in Carnap’s 
thinking between his 1921 dissertation Space and the 1928 Aufbau. For example, Carus sees the 
shift in § 126 from definitions to assignment policies as a holdover from the 1922 manuscript 
“From Chaos to Reality” (169-170). A crucial source of the tensions in the Aufbau is 
Wittgenstein’s conception of logic as “artefacts of representation” (185) and his sparse 
conception of what sorts of propositions are possible. On Carus’ interpretation, Carnap grafted 
this conception of logic onto his prior constitutive project. But Carnap failed to reconcile this 
picture of logic, and the strictures it imposed, with his earlier rational reconstruction project. As 
a result, “At no point in this period *1922-1930] did Carnap reach an equilibrium, an overall 
position that solved all the outstanding problems” (203). Carus views Carnap’s later work, 
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starting with Logical Syntax and the principle of tolerance, as the transformation of the project 
of rational reconstruction of prior knowledge into a more radical explication project. In the 
explication project, existing scientific practices can be discarded if they fail to contribute to a 
more pragmatically effective unified science. 
VI. Contemporary Significance 
As we have seen, Carnap’s Aufbau is of ongoing interest to anyone who shares the 
concerns about empiricism, objectivity or rational reconstruction that interpreters have found 
in the Aufbau. The book has seemed especially important to formally inclined philosophers 
interested in making sense of scientific knowledge. A noteworthy recent example of this is 
Leitgeb’s paper “New Life for Carnap’s Aufbau?”. Leitgeb presents a more modest version of 
Carnap’s project in terms of the preservation of empirical content: “Every scientific sentence 
can be translated into an empirically equivalent one which consists solely of logico-
mathematical signs and terms that refer to a subject’s experience” (4). To achieve this goal, and 
avoid worries analogous to Goodman’s and Quine’s, Leitgeb draws on newly chosen basic 
relations and some results of set theory and contemporary mathematics. The new basis is 
presented as a set of “experiential tropes” (19) or concrete property instances such as the red 
of a particular pencil. The tropes are ordered by one basic relation “<” when they fail to overlap 
temporally and are further grouped together into sets by the other basic relation “Ov” when 
each member of the set has “a common qualitative overlap” (20). This shift allows Leitgeb to 
precisely describe which conditions must obtain for the definitions of the autopsychological 
domain to be successful. Leitgeb argues that he can then overcome Goodman’s concerns about 
companionship and imperfect community. An important further contribution is that Leitgeb 
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offers definitions of dimension that are consistent with only finitely many basic elements. This 
responds to another problem with Carnap’s original approach first noted by Goodman, but also 
endorsed by later commentators such as Friedman. 
When it comes to the transition to the perceptual and physical worlds Leitgeb argues 
that the problem with Carnap’s original approach arise because “is at” is a theoretical term 
whose features are pinned down but not defined by the 12 rules that Carnap offers in § 126. 
This inspires Leitgeb to solve the problem by deploying techniques from later discussions of 
theoretical terms, e.g. the Ramsey-style translation of any sentence B[t] involving the 
problematic term “t” with finitely axiomatized theory A[t] into the sentence x (A[x] & B[x]) 
(Demopoulos). To evaluate this proposal more would have to be said about Leitgeb’s 
understanding of “empirical content” and how he aims to respond to the traditional objections 
against this sort of definition. Whatever we make of the viability of Leitgeb’s approach, it is a 
clear sign of the continuing importance of Carnap’s Aufbau project for philosophy. 
An exciting recent development for Carnap scholarship is the appearance of the first 
volume of the Collected Works of Rudolf Carnap (Carus et. al.). The first translation into English 
of Carnap’s early papers and the scholarly apparatus of this edition of Carnap’s works, along 
with the companion series Full Circle: Publications of the Archives of Scientific Philosophy, will 
surely encourage a new generation of Aufbau scholars.  
 
A Note on Translation 
I have followed more recent scholarship in translating Carnap’s “Konstitutionstheorie” 
as “constitution theory”, unlike George’s choice of “construction theory”. A reason for this is 
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Carnap’s special use of the word “Konstruktion”, as with the title of § 100: “Die Konstitution als 
rationale Nachkonstruktion”. Carnap seems to mainly use “Konstruktion” in connection with 
the language of fictional construction or “die Sprache einer fiktiven Konstruktion”, which 
George awkwardly translates as the “language of fictitious constructive operations” (§ 95) 
(Friedman 137 fn. 38). 
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